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The aim with this study is to evaluate the potential effects on productivity development in the 
Swedish manufacturing industry due to changes in environmental regulations over a long time 
period. The issue is closely related to the so called Porter hypothesis, i.e. whether 
environmental regulations (the right kind) that usually is associated with costs triggers 
mechanisms that enhances efficiency and productivity that finally outweighs the initial cost 
increase. To test our hypothesis we use historical data spanning over the period 1913-1999 for 
the Swedish manufacturing sector. The model used is a two stage model were the total factor 
productivity is calculated in the first stage, and is then used in a second stage as the dependent 
variable in a regression analysis where one of the independent variables is a measure of 
regulatory intensity. The results show that the productivity growth has varied considerably 
over time. The least productive period was the second world war period, whereas the period 
with the highest productivity growth was the period after the second world war until 1970. 
Development of emissions follows essentially the same path as productivity growth until 
1970. After 1970, however, there is a decoupling in the sense that emissions are decreasing, 
both in absolute level and as emissions per unit of value added. A rather robust conclusion is 
that there is no evident relationship between environmental regulations and productivity 
growth. One explanation is that regulations and productivity actually is unrelated. Another 
potential explanation is that the regulatory measure used does not capture perceived 
regulations in a correct way.  
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1. Introduction 
The objective with this study is to analyze the potential effects on productivity development 
in the Swedish manufacturing industry due to changes in environmental regulations. More 
specifically the objective is to test if changes in environmental regulations have different 
effects on productivity in different industrial sectors and in different time periods. The issue 
analyzed is closely related to the so called Porter hypothesis, i.e. whether environmental 
regulations (the right kind) that usually is associated with costs triggers mechanisms that 
enhances efficiency and productivity that finally outweighs the initial cost increase (Porter & 
van der Linde, 1995). To test the hypothesis we develop a two stage model were the first stage 
consist of a, given certain assumptions, calculation of total factor productivity in each 
industrial sector over the period 1913-1999. The second stage is a regression analysis where 
changes in the calculated total factor productivity is regressed on a synthetic measure of 
environmental regulations. Of specific interest is whether the last period (1990-1999) differs 
from previous periods concerning the relation between regulations and productivity. The 
period 1990-1999 is specific in the sense that it can be described as a period with a new 
environmental regulatory regime, in which environmental taxes were introduced in a more 
explicit and broad scale than before. In the analysis we consider two types of emissions, 
related to two different environmental problems; emissions of CO2, related to the green house 
gas problem; emissions of SO2, related to the acidification problem.  
 
The background to our study can be traced back to an idea presented by a one page article in 
Scientific American 1991 where Michael Porter claimed that a strict environmental regulation 
may, contrary to the conventional wisdom, lead to an improvement in competitiveness for 
those firms that are subject to regulation. The idea was elaborated in a paper in the Journal of 
Economic Perspectives in 1995 (van der Linde & Porter, 1995). In the same journal issue, 
Palmer et.al. (1995) was arguing against van der Linde & Porter. The main argument made by 
van der Linde & Porter was that the conventional view upon the costs of regulation was too 
static and do not consider the dynamic nature of the problem. They argued that regulations 
have dynamic effects that may fully offset what they call the static cost. The reasoning behind 
their argument is that regulations forces firms to improve and increase internal as well as 
external efficiency, this through the whole change of the production cycle. Regulations will 
visualize and identify inefficiencies and hence provide solutions to them. Palmer et.al. (1995) 
argues strongly against this. Their main argument is that firms can undertake the   2
improvements voluntarily whenever they want. If firms do not undertake these improvements 
they do not do so because they don’t find it profitable.   
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we elaborate further on the 
Porter hypthesis, discussing the arguments in favour and against. We also briefly review the 
literature. In section 3 we present the model underlying the empirical analysis, whereas 
section 4 provides a description of the data. The estimation results are presented in section 5. 
Section 6, finally, contains some concluding comments and an outline for future research. 
2. The Porter hypothesis 
As discussed above van der Linde & Porter (1995) argued that a stricter environmental policy 
not necessarily imply losses in competitiveness. They based this hypothesis on three 
arguments, basically; (1) regulations are signalling that there are room for efficiency and 
technological improvements; (2) regulations will cause an environmental awareness among 
firms which in addition to efficiency improvements triggers new ways to handle materials as 
well as product innovations; (3) regulations reduces some of the uncertainties that are related 
to investments. If firms know that they must take measures in order to comply with certain 
environmental regulations the number of alternatives will be reduced; (4) regulations put 
pressure not only on the firms that are subject to regulations, but also through the whole chain 
from suppliers of material and equipment to customers.  To support their hypothesis van der 
Linde & Porter referred to a number of cases where it seems as if tighter environmental 
regulations have reduced overall costs for the firms, and/or improved the quality of their 
products. The case studies referred to was mostly firms within the chemical industry. 
 
Palmer et.al. (1995) argued against the hypothesis, and opposed strongly to the view by van 
der Linde & Porter that neoclassical economists generally had a too static mindset view on the 
costs of environmental regulations. Instead, Palmer et.al. pointed at two fundamental 
differences between the Porter view and the neoclassical view. The first, according to Palmer 
et.al., is that van der Linde & Porter presume that that private companies systematically 
overlook profitable opportunities. Second, and perhaps more important, is that within the 
Porter view lies the presumption that the regulatory authority not only can identify these 
opportunities, but also can correct for those kind of failures.  
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The articles by van der Linde & Porter and Palmer et.al. have triggered substantial theoretical 
and empirical research, as well as a lively discussion of the exact meaning of the Porter 
hypothesis. Within the theoretical literature there has been a search for basic mechanisms that 
may give rise to the kind of (unclear) effects that are inherent in the Porter hypothesis. The 
empirical literature follows a number of different branches of the Porter hypothesis, and in the 
best cases they can provide partial tests of the hypothesis. The empirical literature suffers 
from the vagueness of the Porter hypothesis as such, but also what is meant by 
“environmental regulations” and how to measure them.   
 
Broadly speaking there are three different interpretations of the Porter hypothesis, all linked to 
the discussion above; (1) absolute cost reductions for the regulated firms. That is, private 
costs for those firms that are subject to regulations are reduced. This may go through different 
channels (Gabel & Sinclair-Desgagné, 2001), such as improvements in internal and external 
organization which remove internal ineffciencies; (2) relative (to other firms) improvement in 
competitiveness. Although a regulation may raise cost for those who are regulated it may, due 
to learning effects, be more costly for those firms that are regulated later. This is what Porter 
denotes early-mover-advantage; (3) competitiveness improvements due to an increase in 
demand for products and services complementary to environmental regulations. This means 
that it is not the regulated firms per se that gains, but firms that delivers material and 
equipment to the regulated firms. Thus, according to Porter, countries that regulates may 
develop new products and/or equipment that can be sold to other countries when they become 
regulated, and hence get a relative competitive edge. 
 
The theoretical explanations that has emerged can roughly be classified within the three 
categories, or interpretations, as described above; (1) models where firms are inefficient 
because of bounded rationality and problems with co-ordination within the company (Gabel 
& Sinclair-Desgagné, 1998, 2001); (2) models that focus learning, spillovers and other 
positive externalities related to investments and research and development (Mohr, 2002); (3) 
models with imperfect markets and strategic interactions (Simpson & Bradford 1996, Greaker 
2006, Xepapadeas & de Zeeuw, 1999). 
Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) shows that the Porter effect they derive do not completely 
offset the initial cost of the regulation (a tax), but that the trade off between environmental 
regulations and competitiveness may not, under specific assumptions, be as sharp as one   4
would expect. Their result is based on two very central assumptions; the first is that there are 
two firms of which one (domestic) is subject to a regulation, and the other (foreign) is not. 
This assumption simply means that the firms output decision affect the market price. (the 
product is demanded in a third country). The second crucial assumption is that the firms 
capital stock consists of different vintages, where new ones are more productive and cleaner 
than old ones. A regulation will then provide an incentive to invest in a new machine. 
Investment in a new machine will then mean less pollution but they still have a cost for the 
investment. The higher cost, however, will due to the first assumption have a “scale effect” in 
the sense that production goes down with the consequence that the price of the product 
increases, which to some extent offset the initial cost. Simpson & Bradford (1996) succeed to 
show, under similar assumptions, that the regulated (domestic) firm increases its profit under 
the regulation scheme. But as they say, ”In our model we find that this [domestic industrial 
advantage] may be a theoretical possibility, but that it is extremely dubious as practical 
advice.” (Simpson and Bradford, 1996, page 296). 
Mohr (2002), on the other hand, shows that there is a possibility that the costs from a 
regulation are more than neutralized under conditions that are similar to those discussed 
above. However, he adds another crucial assumption concerning learning. He assumes that 
there are many firms, but that they learn from each other. This learning effect means that there 
is a positive externality related to each firm’s investment. An environmental regulation will 
then internalize also this externality. A possible Porter effect is thus driven by the assumption 
that it happens to be an additional externality that is removed as a side effect of the regulation. 
In other words, there is a positive externality associated with a new investment. As pointed 
out, environmental regulations are not unique in this respect. Any regulation which causes 
firms to invest earlier will do the job. Furthermore, as is shown in Feichtinger et.al. (2005), 
this type of effect may demand a further tightening of the regulation, which in the end lead to 
a loss in profits, hence rejecting the Porter hypothesis.  
Another type of externality is analyzed in Greaker (2006). The idea here is that regulations 
give rise to a complete new industry producing abatement equipment. A regulation will boost 
demand for abatement equipment. It is assumed that there are high fixed costs for developing 
abatement equipment, and the boost in demand implies then lower average costs. The lower 
cost of abatement equipment may then neutralize the cost for the downstream firm (the one 
that is regulated). Crucial for the result, although not sufficient, is that the price of abatement 
capital falls as a result of the regulation. The assumptions made may be a reasonable   5
description of reality in the beginning of a regulation process. However, in time when also the 
competitors become regulated they can also utilize the lower cost capital, which in turn will 
lower the price on the downstream market and neutralize the domestic competitive advantage.  
As with the theoretical literature the empirical literature can be divided into different 
categories, testing various parts of the Porter hypothesis. The main categories are those testing 
the effects of regulations on investments and innovation, and those testing the effects on 
efficiency and productivity. In addition there is a substantial literature on regulatory effect on 
trade and firm location (see Jaffe et.al. 1995 for an overview).  
The literature on innovation effects gives no clear answers to what extent regulations affects 
innovations. Jaffe & Palmer (1997) find no evidence that the number of successful patents 
would increase in the American industry as a results of tighter environmental regulations, 
although they find that the expenditure on abatement increases as a result of regulations. 
Brunnermeier och Cohen (2003), however, find a weak relationship between the number of 
patents and regulations in the American industry. The latter study differs from Jaffe & Palmer 
in the sense that Brunnermeier & Cohen focus patents related to environmental innovations. 
Popp (2004) finds similar results using international data. For the Japanese manufacturing 
industry Hamamoto (2006) finds a positive relationship between investement in R&D and 
regulations. 
Concerning the effects on productivity and/or efficiency there is no clear or strong evidence in 
favour of the Porter hypothesis. On the contrary, many studies find a negative relation 
between environmental regulation and firm productivity or efficiency. Gollop och Roberts 
(1983) found that the sulphur regulations applied on American electrical utilities slowed down 
productivity growth by 43% in the 70-ties. Similar results was found in Smith & Sims (1985), 
Barbera & McConell (1990), and Gray & Shadbegian (2003). In a study of the pulp and paper 
industry Boyd & McClelland (1999) finds that although a potential for a more efficient use of 
resources and lower emissions, environmental regulations have negative effects on 
production. Berman & Bui (2001), however, finds that refineries located in south California 
(where regulations are relatively stringent) have had a significantly higher productivity than 
refineries in other parts of the US. Alpay et.al. (2002) find a similar result for the Mexican 
food industry. Hamamoto (2006) finds that environmental regulations have had a positive 
effect on productivity in Japanese manufacturing, via positive effects on R&D. In a study of 
small and medium sized firms within the Dutch horticulture industry Van der Vlist et.al.   6
(2007) finds that those firms that have engaged in voluntary agreements have become more 
efficient than firms that have not engaged in such agreements.
1 
It should be pointed out that there are problems to relate the results from these kinds of studies 
to the strict Porter hypothesis as described above. First of all, any positive relationship 
between innovation and regulation cannot be used in favour of the Porter hypothesis. In fact 
we would certainly expect investments in R&D to increase as a result of regulations, but that 
has nothing to do with the Porter hypothesis. This holds true also for the studies testing for the 
relation between regulations and productivity/efficiency. A positive relation works in favour 
of the Porter hypothesis, but is not a sufficient condition for it to hold. Secondly, the Porter 
hypothesis asserts that the “right kind” of regulations may neutralize costs. Most of the 
empirical studies referred to above do not distinguish between different kinds of regulations. 
In most cases environmental regulations are approximated with expenditures on abatement. 
Van der Vlist et.al. (2007) use participation in voluntary agreements as the regulatory 
variable. However, this may lead to the wrong conclusion due to a selection effect. It can’t be 
ruled out that firms that decide to participate and engage in voluntary agreements are those 
firms that would invest in new technology anyway. 
To summarize there are no clear evidence against or in favour of the Porter hypothesis. 
Concerning productivity, most studies indicate a negative productivity effect from 
environmental regulations.  
3. The model and data  
In this study we are concerned with the relation between productivity growth and 
environmental regulations. The approach taken is the application of a traditional exogenous 
growth model according to Solow (1957). In the empirical analysis where we have discrete 
time we calculate total factor productivity using a Törnqvist index (see for example 
Chambers, 1988, Grosskopf, 1993). In a second stage the Törnqvist index is used as a 
dependent variable in a regression where one of the explanatory variables is a proxy for 
environmental regulations.  
The basic approach can be outlined as follows. To start with, assume that we can express 
production as a function of labor and capital input: 
                                                 
1 Efficiency means hear the distance from the production frontier.   7
[] ) ( ), ( ) ( ) ( t L t K f t A t y = ,       (1) 
where y is production, or value added, K and L are capital and labor input respectively, and 
A(t) is a measure of the technological level at time t. That is, A(t) shifts the production 
function over time, given the amount of capital and labor used. By differentiating (1) totally 
with respect to time, t., we get the expression: 
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where a ”dot” denotes a time derivativ (dy/dt), fK is the marginal product of capital, and fL the 
marginal product of labor.  
If we assume perfect competition on the factor markets we know that the marginal product of 
each factor equals its price (normalized with the output price). This in turn implies that AfKK/y 
and AfLL/y are the capital and labor share respectively of the value added. Furthermore, by 
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where αK is the capital share, and (1-αK) is the labor (wage) share of value added. The change 
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i.e., the change in total factor productivity equals the change in production minus a weighted 
average of the change in factor inputs.. 
For empirical purposes equation (4) has to be transformed to a discrete time scale. To do this 
we use the Törnqvist approximation which measures the logarithmic difference between t och 
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where  ,, , 1 0.5 ( ) Kt Kt Kt α αα + =⋅ +  , i.e. the mean share over t and t+1. 
In the second stage of the analysis we use TFPt as the dependent variable in a regression 
where our regulatory measure is included as an explanatory variable. Since we don’t have any 
actual data on regulations we apply a synthetic measure, R, suggested by Gollop & Roberts 
(1983): 
Data 
The data used in this study is data for the Swedish manufacturing industry divided into 8 
different sectors, stretching over the period 1913.-1999. The sectoral division used in the 
Historical National Accounts for Sweden (SHNA) dictates the organization of the data. In 
practice this classification is fairly consistent with the two-digit ISIC level. Some 
reclassifications have, however, been necessary in order to assure compatibility with the older 
data. The high level of aggregation naturally leads to heterogeneity in some sectors. A 
detailed description of the data and how it is collected and assembled can be found in Balk 
et.al (2006). 
Value added, y, is measured in fixed prices, and labor input, L, is measured as number of 
employees and self-employed company owners. The capital stock is estimated by piecing 
together various sources of information and by using proxy indicators (see Balk et.al., 2006). 
The emissions considered are sulfur dioxide (SO2) and carbon dioxide (CO2). Emissions of 
sulfur dioxide were calculated on basis of estimates of total sulfur emissions from energy use. 
The main difficulty is the distribution of the emissions over the respective sectors. This is 
done by estimating historical emission factors for coal and liquid fuels and then applying the 
emission factors to the fuel input data. Secondly, process emissions were allocated to the 
sectors. The CO2 emissions were calculated on the basis of Statistics Sweden's emission 
factors for various fuels. In practice the CO2 emissions are nearly linearly dependent on the 
use of fossil fuels, affected only by composition changes. The data on the capital share (αΚ) 
and labor share (1-αΚ) of value added is obtained from Vikström (2002). 
In summary the data used in this study spans the period 1913-1999 and cover eight Swedish 
manufacturing sectors. The sectors are: 
1: Mining and metal industry 
2: Stone, clay and glass industry   9
3: Wood products industry 
4: Pulp. paper and printing industry 
5: Food processing industry 
6: Textile and clothing industry 
7: Leather, hair and rubber industry 
8: Chemical industry 
Figure 1 gives a description of the aggregated output data that is used (value added and 
emissions). Here we can see that value added has been increasing more or less monotonically 
over the whole time period. An exception though is in the thirties and during World War II. 




























Figure 1. Value added, SO2, and CO2 emissions in Swedish manufacturing 1913-1990. 
Index, 1913=100. 
 
If we look at the trends in emissions we see that they follow the value-added series closely 
until the mid seventies. However, in the mid seventies there is a sharp break in the trend; 
emissions of both sulfur and carbon dioxide start to decrease sharply. Thus, casual inspection 
of the simple time trends in value added and emissions would suggest that the environmental 
productivity, emissions per unit of output, in Swedish manufacturing have increased at a fast 
rate since the mid seventies. 
The Box-plots in Figures 2 and 3 describe the development over time of emissions per unit of 
value added, including the mean and distribution across sectors. These figures show that mean   10
emissions per unit of value added for both CO2 and SO2 have decreased over time. That is, the 
Swedish manufacturing industry has become less carbon and sulfur intensive over time. It can 

























































































Figure 3. SO2 emissions kg/1000 SEK value added, mean and variation in each year.   11
Table 1 displays the structural change within the Swedish industry since 1913 in terms of each 
industry’s share of the value added. The metal and mining industry accounted for 
approximately 23% of value added in the pre-war period, whereas the chemical industry 
accounted for only 1%. After 1945 there has, however, been a relative strong structural 
change. Metal and mining, and chemistry have increased their share on the expense of almost 
all other industries except the pulp and paper industry. Here it can be worth noting that the 
industries that have expanded are those who are considered to be those who affect the 
environment mostly.   
Table 1. Percentage share of total Swedish industrial value added for different industries. 
  1913-1938 1939-1945 1946-1969 1970-1988 1989-1999 
(1) Metal and 
mining  23 23 43 52 50 
(2) Stone, clay 
and glass 
7 6 7 5 3 
(3) Wood and 
wood products  19 18 11 10 07 
(4) Pulp and 
paper  11 11 11 13 16 
(5)  Food  25 25 14 10 10 
(6) Textile  12  12  08  3  1 
(7) Leather and 
rubber  2 2 2 1 1 
(8)  Chemical  1 1 3 6  11 
 
Empirical model 
Given the data we calculate, in the first stage, the productivity change in each sector 
according to: 
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where  ,, ,, ,,1 0.5 ( ) iKt iKt iKt α αα + =⋅ +  , i.e. the mean share over t and t+1. 
In the second stage TFPi,t in equation (6) is regressed on a regulator measure. However, no 
direct regulatory measure exists. To overcome this problem a regulatory index has been 
created using actual emissions. The index, which is similar to the index suggested in Gollop   12
and Roberts (1983), consist essentially of two parts; a part that measures the tightness of 
regulations, which is measured as the difference between desired emission (unregulated) and 
actual emissions, divided by desired emissions. The second part measures the degree of 
compliance on a scale between 0 and 1. In this study we only use the first part of that index, 
the tightness part.  
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where z
* is the desired, or unregulated, emission level, and z the actual emissions. It is clear 
that 0 ≤ R ≤ 1. The desired emission level in any time period, z
*, is defined as the highest 
emission level during a five year period. That is, 
*
,, max , [ , 4] it i zz t t τ τ =∈ +        (8) 
A high value of R implies then a relative strict regulation, compared to a low value of R which 
implies a lax regulation since actual emissions then are close to desired emissions. If R = 0, 
then actual emissions equals desired emissions, i.e. no regulatory pressure on the margin. 
The regulatory index is computed for both SO2 and CO2 emissions and is based not on 
absolute emissions but on emissions per unit value added. Emissions per unit value added 
depends probably less on short run factors such as the business cycle, than absolute emissions. 
There are of course several problems connected with a regulatory measure of this type, 
especially when we consider such a long time period. Emissions of SO2 and CO2 have not 
been viewed as any major problem until the last 30-40 years. Thus a high value of R may not 
correspond to tight regulations when we go back in time. An attempt to control for this is 
made by using an interaction term in which time and R interacts. That is, the effect of R is 
allowed to vary between time periods. Furthermore we allow TFP to be time specific, in the 
sense that we allow TFP to vary over time independent of regulations. Finally we include a 
variable measuring nuclear power capacity. The latter may be important since it was a rather 
massive introduction of nuclear power in Sweden in the 70’ies that may have affected 
productivity in the Swedish industry. 
The specification that is used in the second stage can then be written as:   13
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where the index i = 1,…, 8 refers to the sectors: 
1: Mining and metal industry 
2: Stone, clay and glass industry 
3: Wood products industry 
4: Pulp. paper and printing industry 
5: Food processing industry 
6: Textile and clothing industry 
7: Leather, hair and rubber industry 
8: Chemical industry 
t = 1913-1999 
Di,1,t = 1 if: 1939 ≤ t ≤ 1945; 0 otherwise. 
Di,2,t = 1 if: 1946 ≤ t ≤ 1969; 0 otherwise. 
Di,3,t = 1 if: 1970 ≤ t ≤ 1989; 0 otherwise. 
 Di,4,t = 1 if: 1990 ≤ t ≤ 1999; 0 otherwise. 
NUCt = total installed effect in nuclear electricity production in period t, and R is defined by 
equations (7) and (8). 
The results from the calculations of TFP in equation (8), and the second stage results obtained 
from equation (9) are presented in the next section. 
4. Results 
The results from the calculation of total factor productivity according to equation (6) are 
displayed in table 2, together with changes in emissions. The results are presented as a yearly 
average for the specific time period. A positive value of TFP implies that value added has 
increased more than the weighted sum of labor and capital, i.e. productivity has increased. 
Environmental productivity is displayed as percentage changes of emissions, in absolute 
levels and as changes in emissions per unit of value added.   14
The period 1913-1999 has been divided into 5 sub-periods; the pre-war period, 1913-1938; 
the war period, 1939-1945; the after-war period, 1946-1969; the nuclear period, 1970-1988; 
and the green tax period, 1989-1999. 
Table 2. Productivity growth and environmental effectivenss in the Swedish industry 1913-















1913 – 1938 
TFP  1.60 2.01 0.31 0.05 1.86 1.69 0.39 1.43  1.26 
CO2  3.76 4.57  17.88 5.83 17.08 3.46 3.71 3.32  5.15 
CO2FV  -1.62 0.05  15.86 0.77 14.13 0.37 1.66 -2.13  3.63 
SO2  14.00 4.59  17.66 6.41 17.08 3.49 3.69 3.39 10.28 
SO2FV  10.7 0.07  15.58 1.06 14.13 0.39 1.65 -2.06  5.19 
1939 – 1945 
TFP  -7.01 -2.51 -0.34 -1.16 -1.59 -1.26 1.47 -3.2  -2.55 
CO2  -7.79  -3.7 -30.42 -27.09 -11.82 -20.57 6.62 -5.32  -8.36 
CO2FV  -6.20  -7.66 -31.72 -28.00 -25.8 -22.87 -3.47 -10.32  -17.00 
SO2  2.11  -3.75 -30.38 -13.29 17.08 -20.75 6.98 -5.23  0.17 
SO2FV  10.7  -7.72 -31.72 -15.77 -13.99 -23.05 -3.24 -10.3  -11.88 
1946 – 1969 
TFP  4.47 3.30 3.55 2.05 1.25 2.99 3.48 3.34  3.39 
CO2  8.89  5.79 94.99 25.70 6.45 15.98 7.54 8.99  9.60 
CO2FV  0.87  1.47 74.98 16.93 4.55 13.63 2.98 1.15  14.57 
SO2 2.39  6.74  110.48  16.26 7.70 18.41 8.89 10.15  8.43 
SO2FV  -4.68  2.34 87.24 10.08 5.81 16.01 4.24 2.21  15.41 
1970 – 1988 
TFP  1.63 1.04 0.22 2.14 0.29 1.29 -0.43 3.83  1.49 
CO2  -1.51  -3.8 -2.43 -6.03 -2.03 -7.18 -9.77 -4.39  -3.28 
CO2FV  -3.56 -3.00 -2.93 -9.11 -2.08 -3.14 -7.5 -9.57  -5.11 
SO2  -7.06 -9.07 -6.41 -6.35 -6.42 -11.05 -12.27 -9.15  -7.54 
SO2FV  -9.01 -8.29 -7.08 -9.88 -6.62 -7.16 -10.1 -14.29  -9.05 
1989 – 1999 
TFP  0.69  4.94 -0.71 -0.28 2.20 3.58 3.36 -3.10  0.32 
CO2 -5.06  -1.60  -0.65  3.01 0.02 -3.15 -6.61 6.52  -0.86 
CO2FV -6.00  1.92  -0.24  2.43 -1.64 0.39 -6.42 2.05  -0.94 
SO2 -6.68  -5.76  -0.2  -2.31 -1.78 -1.30 -9.81 -0.08  -3.69 
SO2FV -7.46  -2.27  0.27  -2.61 -3.49 2.12 -9.57 -4.36  -3.42 







= percentage change in total factor productivity, yearly average. 
= percentage change in CO2 emissions, yearly average. 
= percentage change in CO2 emissions per unit value added, yearly average. 
= percentage change in SO2 emissions, yearly average. 
= percentage change in sO2 emissions per unit value added, yearly average. 
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From table 2 it can be seen that there are differences both in TFP and environmental 
productivity between the different sub-periods. Furthermore there is a variation between 
sectors within each subperiod. As expected, the war period is characterized with low 
productivity growth. In fact, productivity decreases during this time period. The war period 
can be viewed as an involuntary adjustment of the Swedish energy system where imported 
fossil fuels where replaced by mainly domestic renewable fuels such as forest fuels. This 
change of the energy system becomes clear when looking at the emission changes, which 
shows a considerable decrease of both CO2 and SO2. Worth noting here is that the absolute 
level of emissions in general decreased faster than the emissions per unit of value added, 
which indicates that the radical change in energy supply did not affect energy efficiency 
positively.  
The period 1945-1969 is dramatically different concerning productivity. The yearly average 
productivity increase between 1946 and 1969 is 3.4%. This period is thus the most productive 
period in Swedish manufacturing. On the sectoral level it is only the pulp and paper industry 
and food industry that have a productivity growth lower than 2%. At the same it can be seen 
that CO2 emissions increases by almost 10% per year, whereas SO2 increases by 8.5% (in 
absolute levels). Again, emissions per unit of value added increases even faster, implying 
more fossil fuel intensive production also during this period.     
The period 1970-1988 deviates from the preceeding period both when it comes to productivity 
and emissions, especially the latter. As can be seen from table 2, emissions are decreasing 
both in absolute terms and in terms of emissions per unit of value added. This pattern is 
similar in all industrial sectors, implying a “decoupling” between growth and emissions. The 
change in emissions was possible due to the massive expansion of nuclear power during this 
period, but also due to the increase in the use of biofuels.  
Finally the period 1989-1999, the green tax period, is characterized by a rather, between 
sectors, diverse development. Some sectors have a relative strong productivity development, 
whereas others have a weak, or even negative, productivity development. Those with the 
strongest development are stone, clay and glass industry; food industry; textile industry; and 
leather and rubber industry. This last period is specific in the sense that the SO2 tax and the 
CO2 tax was introduced during this period in Sweden. The CO2 tax, which was introduced 
January 1 1991, was set to SEK 250 per ton CO2 (USD 36 per ton), which to some extent was 
compensated by a 50% decrease of the energy tax. In total the introduction of the CO2 tax   16
implied a higher tax on fossil fuels. The SO2 tax, which was introduced the same year, was set 
to SEK 30 per kg sulphur in fuels (USD 4 per kg). After the tax reform in 1991 there has been 
several adjustments of the energy tax system and a continuous increase of the CO2 tax rate, 
but the rate that hit the most energy intensive part of the industry have not increased at the 
same pace as the general rate. In summary one can say that there was a rather sharp increase 
in the tax of fossil fuels during the first part of the 90’ies, but that there has been a moderation 
during the second part. Furthermore, the effective tax rate differs between sectors. 
Until 1970 there is a negative relationship between productivity change and change in 
environmental effectiveness for all sectors in the industry, i.e. higher productivity is 
accompanied with higher emissions (both in absolute level and per unit value added). After 
1970 this pattern is reversed, i.e. higher productivity is accompanied with lower emissions. 
The main results from the second stage of the analysis are presented in table 3.
2 The 
regulatory index used in the regression model presented in table 3 is based on the emissions of 
CO2 per unit value added. Several other measures (based on sulphur and absolute levels) have 
bee tried, but the results remains essentially unchanged (see appendix 1).  
Row 2 to 5 corresponds to the period specific effects, whereas row 6 to 10 corresponds to the 
regulatory effects, which are of specific interest. 
In general there are very few significant relationships between the regulatory index and 
productivity growth. A significant positive relationship is found for the period after the 
second world war for the metal and mining sector. This, however, do probably reveal the 
problem with the specific regulatory measure used than a real causal relationship since 
environmental concern was a minor issue during this period. More likely the result mirrors the 
sharp general increase in productivity during this period. A positive relationship can also be 
found in the stone, clay and glass industry, as well as in the food industry. However, neither 
of these industries shows any significant differences between the time periods. The latter 
contradicts the interpretation that the relationship is causal. The rubber industry on the other 
hand show a significant positive relationship for the last period, the tax period, which may 
provide support for the Porter hypothesis for this particular industry.
3 
                                                 
2 Detailed estimation results for each sector are presented in appendix 1. Table 3 focus the time specific and 
regulatory effects only.  
3 As pointed out earlier, a positive effect is not sufficient for a strict Porter effect.   17
Table 5.3. Regression results, change in total factor productivity. Dependent variable is TFP. 


















































































































































































R2  0.17  0.09  0.03 0.04 0.26 0.04 0.09  0.04 
DW  1.61  1.62  1.98 2.53 1.94 2.47 2.05  1.86 
NOBS  86  86  86 86 86 86 86  86 
* = Significant different from zero at the 10% level 
 
The results in table 4 show the results from an alternative approach where the last periods are 
analyzed separately. A panel approach is used, employing sector specific fixed effects, as well 
as an interaction term between the sector dummy and the regulatory index, R. In addition, two 
different regulation measures are used. In “model 1” we use the same measure as above, 
whereas in “model 2” we use the annual change in emissions per unit of value added as a 
regulatory measure. The interpretation of this latter measure is that a decrease implies a 
stricter regulation. Thus we would expect an opposite sign of the coefficient, compared to the 
coefficient corresponding to the first measure (“model 1”). 
The results in table 4 do not reveal any specific strong patterns between total factor 
productivity and the regulatory measures employed. The only significant result can be found 
in “model 2” for the period 1970-1999, where there is a common negative relationship 
between productivity growth and change in emissions, implying that a decrease in emission   18
(per unit of value added), is coupled with an increase in productivity growth. However, there 
are no significant differences between the industrial sectors, nor can we find this effect for the 
period 1989-1999, a period we really would expect a Porter effect. An alternative explanation 
to the significant negative sign is the increase of electricity from nuclear power, which is free 
from emissions.   
Table 4. Regression results, change in total factor productivity. Dependent variable is TFP for 
the periods 1970 and 1989-199. t-values within parenthesis. 








































































































































R2  0.02 0.20 0.14 0.18 
DW  2.20 1.66 1.40 1.29 
NOBS  240 240 88  88 
Modell 1: R = (z*-z)/z* 
Modell 2: R = (CO2(t)-CO2(t-1))/CO2(t-1).   19
5. Summary and concluding remarks 
The aim with this study is to evaluate the potential effects on productivity development in the 
Swedish manufacturing industry due to changes in environmental regulations over a long time 
period. The issue is closely related to the so called Porter hypothesis, i.e. whether 
environmental regulations (the right kind) that usually is associated with costs triggers 
mechanisms that enhances efficiency and productivity that finally outweighs the initial cost 
increase. To test our hypothesis we use historical data spanning over the period 1913-1999 for 
the Swedish manufacturing sector. The model used is a two stage model were the total factor 
productivity is calculated in the first stage, and is then used in a second stage as the dependent 
variable in a regression analysis where one of the independent variables is a measure of 
regulatory intensity.  
The results show that the productivity growth has varied considerably over time. The least 
productive period was the second world war period, whereas the period with the highest 
productivity growth was the period after the second world war until 1970. Development of 
emissions follows essentially the same path as productivity growth until 1970. After 1970, 
however, there is a decoupling in the sense that emissions are decreasing, both in absolute 
level and as emissions per unit of value added. 
Concerning the relationship between regulations and productivity growth, a rather robust 
conclusion is that there is no clear relationship, given the regulatory measure used. One 
explanation is that the effect does not exist, or that it is too small to be measured compared to 
other factors affecting productivity growth. Another potential explanation is that the measure 
used do not capture actual regulations in a correct way. A tentative conclusion, though, is that 
the part of the Porter hypothesis that asserts that the right kind of regulations enhances 
productivity can be rejected. 
A crucial factor in the analysis is of course the regulatory measure used. It can’t be ruled out 
that the results obtained here are flawed due to a bad measure of regulatory intensity. Thus, a 
subject for future research is to find more accurate measures of regulations. If the issue is the 
Porter hypothesis, a potential avenue to proceed on in this respect is to more clearly identify 
different regulatory regimes. This may be particularly fruitful using a cross country panel data 
set.     20
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Appendix 1. 
 
Table A1. Regression results. Dependent variable is change in total factor procutivity, t-values 
within parenthesis. 
Metal and mining 






















































































Nuclear   0.04 
(0.10) 
   0.06 
(0.16) 
R2  0.12 0.11 0.15 0.17 .0.14 
DW 1,78 1.80 1.77 1.61 1.78 
NOBS  86 86 86 86 86 
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Table A1 (continued) 
 
Stone, clay and glass industry 






















































































Nuclear   0.14 
(0.34) 
   0.04 
(0.08) 
R2  0.02 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.07 
DW 1.51 1.52 1.76 1.62 1.63 
NOBS  86 86 86 86 86 
R2 0.004  0,004  0.07 0.03 0.02 
DW 1.83 1.84 2.08 1.98 1.97 
NOBS  86 86 86 86 86 
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Table A1 (continued) 
 
Wood industry 






















































































Nuclear   0.03 
(0.06) 
   -0.04 
-0.07 
R2 0.004  0,004  0.07 0.03 0.02 
DW 1.83 1.84 2.08 1.98 1.97 
NOBS  86 86 86 86 86 
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Table A1 (continued) 
 
Pulp and paper industry 






















































































Nuclear   0.22 
(0.36) 
   0.36 
(0.50) 
R2  0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 
DW 2.43 2.44 2.53 2.53 2.53 
NOBS  86 86 86 86 86 
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Table A1 (continued) 
 
Food industry 






















































































Nuclear   0.09 
(0.28) 
   .038 
(0.12) 
R2  0.03 0.02 0.18 0.26 0.25 
DW 1.59 1.59 1.98 1.94 1.95 
NOBS       
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Table A1 (continued) 
 
Textile industry 






















































































Nuclear   0.04 
(0.08) 
   0.03 
(0.06) 
R2  0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 
DW 2.45 2.45 2.45 2.47 2.47 
NOBS  86      
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Table A1 (continued) 
 
Leather and rubber industry 






















































































Nuclear   0.02 
(0.05) 
   0.053727 
(0.11) 
R2  0.04 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.08 
DW 2.18 2.18 2.19 2.05 2.05 
NOBS 86  0.04       
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Table A1 (continued) 
 
Chemical industry 






















































































Nuclear   0.61 
(1.03) 
   0.68 
(1.16) 
R2  0.02 0.02 0.13 0.04 0.04 
DW 1.72 1.74 2.07 1.86 1.90 
NOBS  86 86 86 86 86 
  
 
 